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COMMENTS
TOWARDS A PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
ABORTION DECISION: THE INTERESTS OF THE
PHYSICIAN, THE WOMAN AND THE FETUS
The United States Supreme Court has considered the issue of a
woman's right to an abortion, I and has resolved that such a right, guar-
anteed under the concept of individual privacy,2 does exist. The Court
did not, however, discuss the ramifications of an abortion resulting in a
live birth, nor did the Court resolve the question of when life actually
begins.3 Instead, the Court couched its decision in terms relating only
to the fetus,4 stating that the fetus is not a person within the contempla-
tion of the law.' Many have disagreed with this conclusion, asserting
that traditional Anglo-American law has always recognized the fetus as
a person.' However, a careful analysis of property, tort, wrongful death,
social welfare and criminal law indicates that the fetus has never been
accorded the rights and privileges of persons. Because the fetus is not a
person under the law, it has no right to life and cannot in and of itself
restrict the pregnant woman's decision to abort. That decision may be
limited only by the state's legitimate interest in the potential of life in
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 153.
3. Id. at 159.
4. Id. at 159-68. The Court examined historical interests under the common law, state
statutes, and the United States Constitution.
5. Id. at 158.
6. See Byrn, Abortion-On-Demand: Whose Morality?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5 (1970);
Destro, Abortion and the Constitutio-n: The Need for a Life-Protective Amendment, 63
CALIF. L. REV. 1250 (1975); Rice, The Dred Scott Case of the Twentieth Century, 10 Hous.
L. REV. 1059 (1973); Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical
Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349 (1971) [hereinafter cited as The Law and the
Unborn Child]; Note, The Unborn Child and the Constitutional Conception of Life, 56
IOWA L. REV. 994 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Conception of Life].
More than 100 bills have been introduced into the 93rd and 94th Congress in support
of the movement to give the fetus rights of personhood. Letter from Lester S. Jayson,
Director, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., to
Mary Sebek, Aug. 20, 1975. The most recent "Right-to-Life" legislative effort occurred on
April 28, 1976, when Senator Jessie A. Helm (R-NC) attempted to bypass the Senate
Judiciary Committee and introduce directly onto the Senate floor a constitutional amend-
ment invalidating the Roe v. Wade decision. Discussion on the proposed amendment was
tabled by a vote of 47-40. Chicago Sun-Times, Apr. 29, 1976, at 2, col. 1.
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the fetus' at viability-the interim point at which the fetus is "poten-
tially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid."I
In ruling on the question of a woman's right to abort a fetus, the Court
unfortunately overlooked the situation in which the abortion results in
a live birth. Live birth occurs when the fetus exhibits life signs' after
removal from the woman's body, whether or not the fetus is capable of
meaningful survival.'" Because the Court apparently was not cognizant
of the possibility of live birth after abortion, it focused only on the
interests of the fetus prior to abortion and did not consider the legal
7. [Ilt is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point
in time another interest, that of... potential human life, becomes significantly
involved. The woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she
possesses must be measured accordingly.
410 U.S. at 159.
8. Id. at 160. The Court placed the point of compelling state interest at viability, noting
that "the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's
womb." Id. at 163 (emphasis added). Unfortunately, the Court did not choose to define
"meaningful life." This raises the question of whether meaningful life is any life or only
that life which will eventually be capable of independent self-sustenance. For a discussion
of how increasingly sophisticated life-support systems may affect viability, see Comment,
Viability and Abortion, 64 Ky. L.J. 146, 160-63 (1975).
At viability, the state may protect its interest in the potential of life in the fetus by
limiting or even proscribing elective abortions. 410 U.S. at 163-64. However, under the Roe
guidelines, a state need not exercise this right. Since a fetus is not a person, it has no right
to demand such protection from the state; rather, it is entitled to only that degree of
protection which the state determines to be within its own best interests.
An alternative to the state's exercise of its power would be its delegation of that power
in the form of a statutory cause of action to specific third-parties. For example, the state
could permit the putative father to enjoin the performance of a third trimester abortion,
on the theory that the abortion would deprive him of a relational interest in the child the
fetus would become. However, this method presents enforcement problems. Notifying all
physicians who might perform such an abortion is impractical. Therefore, the pregnant
woman might have to be imprisoned to prevent her from obtaining an abortion. For a
discussion of the possibility of imprisoning a pregnant woman to prevent her from exercis-
ing her fundamental right to abortion, see Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 133-34 (Mass. 1974)
(Hennessey, J., dissenting).
The state might also give the putative father or heirs apparent a right to sue for dam-
ages. This method was attempted in 1973 by the Utah state legislature. See UTAH CODE
ANN. §§76-7-307 to 76-7-308 (Supp. 1973). The statute was held unconstitutional in Doe
v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973), because it prohibited the free exercise of
the guaranteed right to abortion prior to fetal viability. Had the state limited the remedy
to compensation for the abortion of viable, third trimester fetuses, the statute might have
been constitutional.
9. Life signs may include independent breathing, movement of the arms and legs, or a
beating heart. The concept of live birth is discussed in notes 82-85 and accompanying text
infra.
10. See note 8 supra.
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ramifications of live birth. As a result, the legal responsibilities which
the physician, the state, and the mother may owe to the aborted live-
born are in doubt.
In addition, the Court failed to adequately identify and analyze the
technical problems inherent in the determination of viability. Specifi-
cally, a physician cannot accurately predict the gestational age of a
fetus; therefore, he cannot precisely delineate the point of viability." As
a consequence, the physician who in good faith believes he is aborting a
non-viable fetus may be subject to prosecution for wrongful abortion if
the fetus is subsequently determined to have been viable. To avoid
prosecution, many physicians have refused to perform abortions during
the second trimester, 2 thus directly affecting the pregnant woman's
access to and exercise of her fundamental right to abort a non-viable
fetus.
In order to alleviate these and other problems engendered by the Roe
v. Wade decision, suggested guidelines for abortion will be proposed.
The guidelines will seek to implement Roe v. Wade by defining and
reconciling the woman's exercise of her fundamental right to abortion
with the physician's right to practice his profession free from unwar-
ranted prosecution and the state's legitimate interest in the potential
of fetal life at viability. As a necessary prelude to the guidelines, and
in order to correct the misconceptions concerning the status of the
fetus, the author will first examine the legal precedent supporting the
Court's holding that the fetus is not a person. Such an examination is
essential to both an accurate appraisal of the scope and magnitude of
the woman's right to abortion and a basic understanding of the sug-
gested guidelines.
FETAL INTEREST ANALYSIS
Property Law
The common law of property has been cited by many legal writers in
support of the contention that the fetus is a person and, as such, is
entitled to all of the rights and privileges accorded other persons under
the law.'3 However, this position ignores one of the basic tenets of prop-
erty jurisprudence: any bequest to an unborn is a gift of a contingent
interest in property. The interest becomes vested only upon the live
11. See notes 74-77 and accompanying text infra.
12. Alpern, Abortion and the Law, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 3, 1975, at 24 [hereinafter cited
as Alpern]. For a discussion of two criminal cases involving physician liability for abor-
tions performed, see note 79 infra.
13. See note 6 supra.
14. See generally C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 116-28
[Vol. 25:676
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birth of the fetus. Thus the rights of the fetus are clearly distinguishable
from those of persons. While a person may have either a vested or a
contingent interest in property, the interest of a fetus is always contin-
gent upon its live birth. The fetus itself may never have an estate, but
merely the possibility of an estate, for it is not entitled to the use,
possession or enjoyment of any property prior to birth. 5 Likewise, if the
fetus is a potential member of a class of beneficiaries, the class will not
open and let it in until it has been born alive."6
The courts have been less than clear in their treatment of fetal inter-
ests as contingencies. For example, some courts, in an attempt to
protect property subject to a contingent fetal interest, have declared
that "a child en ventre sa mre [in its mother's womb] is 'born' and
'alive' for all purposes for his benefit."17 From such statements, advo-
cates of the fetal rights position 8 have argued that since a fetus may
inherit property as if it were a child already born, the law must consider
it so for all purposes. 9 However, protection of the contingent fetal inter-
(1962) [hereinafter cited as MOYNIHAN], dealing specifically with vested and contingent
remainders. See, e.g., United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399 (1941), wherein a donor who
transferred property in trust for the benefit of an unborn grandchild was held to have
transferred a future interest and therefore could not claim an exclusion from taxes under
the Uniform Gift to Minors provision of the Internal Revenue Code. Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§504(b), 47 Stat. 247 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2503(b)). See also 67-384, 1967-2 CuM.
BUL. 348.
15. [Llegal relations with respect to property can exist only between persons
in being. When we speak of a contingent remainder in unborn persons we mean
that the law recognizes the possibility of a legal relationship arising in the future
and that the recognition of this potential interest has present legal consequences
. , **(emphasis added)
MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 125-26. But see Constitutional Conception of Life, supra note
6, at 999. See also Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of
Law, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 233, 241 (1969).
16. MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 119-20. This method of distribution is consistent with
the theory that, although unborn beneficiaries are entitled to take property equally with
those beneficiaries living at the death of the testator, enjoyment in possession of the
subject property is postponed until birth. Although courts often appoint a guardian ad
litem for such unborns, the guardian's function is protection of the property, and not
protection of the unborns.
17. In re Holthausen's Will, 175 Misc. 1022, 1024, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140, 143 (Sur. Ct. 1941);
accord, Deal v. Sexton, 144 N.C. 157, 160, 56 S.E. 691, 692 (1907). This rule is not directed
at the interests of the fetus, but rather at the interests of the person the fetus will become
upon live birth.
18. Advocates of the fetal rights position assert that the fetus is a person from the
moment of conception and as such is entitled to the rights and privileges accorded persons
born alive, including the right to life.
19. Constitutional Conception of Life, supra note 6, at 999-1000, relying on Wallis v.
Hodson, 26 Eng.Rep. 472 (Ch. 1740) (posthumous child entitled to an accounting of her
1976]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
est is not protection for the benefit of the fetus. Rather, it is protection
for the person the fetus may become.
The common law rules of intestate succession have been codified gen-
erally by state inheritance statutes. These statutes, like the common
law, give the fetus no immediately cognizable interest in property. The
fetus is precluded from taking as an intestate heir by virtue of the fact
that an heir must survive the decedent .2 Only upon live birth does the
fetus, as a child, fulfill the required condition of survival. Similarly, a
fetus may take by intestate succession as a posthumous child of the
decedent only if it is subsequently born.2 ' Finally, only a child may take
as a pretermitted heir.22 If the fetus may not acquire property, it will
obviously have nothing of which to dispose. For example, if property is
devised to a fetus which is subsequently stillborn, the property does not
pass through an "estate" of the fetus but rather through that of the
grantor. On the other hand, if property is devised to a child who subse-
quently dies, the property passes through his estate for distribution to
his heirs and not to those of the grantor. The distinction can effect a
vastly different outcome in property distribution . 2
deceased father's estate); Industrial Trust Co. v. Wilson, 61 R.I. 169, 200 A. 467 (1938)
(unborn child entitled to share in the income of the trust from the date of her father's
death rather than upon the date of her subsequent birth). See also Trower v. Butts, 57
Eng.Rep. 72 (1823) (child in gestation at the testator's death may, at birth, take under
will description bequeathing property to those "living at the [testator's] decease"). How-
ever, these results do not prove that the fetus is a person. In each case, the unborn child
has an interest in property that will ripen upon birth. Should the fetus be stillborn, none
of these rights or benefits accrues.
20. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 854 (4th ed, rev. 1968).
21. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §2-108 (1969). See also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, §2-3 (1975):
"A posthumous child of a decedent shall receive the same share of his ancestor's intestate
estate as if he had been born in his father's lifetime." (emphasis added)
22. These statutes apply only to children born or adopted after the execution of a will.
See, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §2-302 (1969); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, §4.10 (1975).
23. This occurs when a devise contains alternative limitations, each subject to a condi-
tion precedent:
A, the grantor, devises Blackacre to C for life, then to the children of C, and if
C has no children, then to D.
Assume that C has no children at the creation of the grant. Then D and the unborn
children of C have mutually exclusive, alternate contingent remainders in Blackacre
during the life of C. If C dies without children, then title to Blackacre will pass directly
to D, in accordance with the will of A, the grantor. MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 124.
24. For example, assume the following devise in a will:
X devises Blackacre to A for life, then to the children of C who are born during
A's lifetime.
At the creation of the grant, C is alive but has no children. Each of the following events
may occur during the life of A:
[Vol. 25:676
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In sum, an analysis of the interests of the fetus demonstrates that the
law of property provides no basis for the contention that the fetus is a
person under the law. Its rights are always dependent upon fulfillment
of the condition precedent of live birth. Only when the fetus becomes a
person at birth is it entitled to the rights and privileges accorded per-
sons.
Tort Law
Under the common law of torts, as in the law of property, the fetus is
without the independent rights of a person. All of its interests are con-
tingent upon the condition precedent of live birth. That is, although a
fetus may sustain injuries during the prenatal period, it has no action
of its own for compensation. Only upon subsequent live birth does the
cause of action for damages accrue to the child. Advocates of fetal rights
ignore this born/unborn distinction and reason that because compensa-
tion may be recovered for fetal injuries, a cause of action accrues to the
fetus. 5 An analysis of fetal interest exposes the fallacy of this conclu-
sion.
The primary purpose of tort recovery is to compensate a wronged
party for damages he has sustained." The action was originally limited
to recovery for injuries inflicted upon a person then in existence., Prena-
a. If C has two children, then title to Blackacre will vest equally in each of the class
members. If either child subsequently dies intestate, the property will pass into the child's
estate for distribution to his heirs. No part of the property will revert back to the grantor's
estate.
b. If C has one child and a fetus in gestation, which is subsequently born alive but
dies immediately after birth, then title to Blackacre will again vest equally in each of the
class members. The property interest of the deceased liveborn will pass into his own estate
for distribution to his heirs.
c. If C has one child and a fetus in gestation, which dies before birth, then title to
Blackacre will vest only in the living child. The share the unborn would have received had
it been born alive will not pass into an estate for the unborn; instead, it will vest directly
in the living child, the only member of the class who qualifies.
d. If C has only a fetus in gestation, which subsequently dies before birth, then there
are no qualified class members to take title to Blackacre at A's death. Therefore, title will
automatically revert back to the estate of the grantor for distribution to his heirs.
25. See Rice, supra note 6, at 1072-74.
26. Initially, remedies were designed to punish the tortfeasor. Redress for satisfaction
of the injured party's claim was added some time later. F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION
AT COMMON LAW 65 (1941); Woodbine, The Origin of the Action of Trespass (pts. 1-2), 33
YALE L.J. 799 (1924), 34 YALE L.J. 343 (1925).
27. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §869 (1939); Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 IIl. 359, 56 N.E.
638 (1900); Ryan v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 18 N.J. Misc. 429, 14 A.2d 52
(1940); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
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tal injuries were specifically excluded under the theory that the unborn
child was part of the mother at the time of the injury. As a result, only
damage to the fetus which physically affected the mother was recovera-
ble by her. No separate action for injuries to the fetus was allowed."8
However, in the landmark case of Bonbrest v. Kotz, 5 the common law
cause of action was expanded to include recovery for injuries sustained
during the process of live birth.'" More recently, courts have allowed
recovery to a child for injuries suffered during gestation." Significantly,
these cases discuss recovery only in terms of the interests of the liveborn
child; they are silent as to any rights of the unborn.
Bonbrest and the related cases have done nothing to create rights of
personhood in the fetus. They merely make the fetus's position under
the common law of torts consistent with its position under the law of
property.2 The fetus itself is given no new cause of action. Rather, the
person the fetus is to become is permitted a personal right of recovery
contingent upon live birth. If the fetus is stillborn, no action will lie.33
28. Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884) (unborn child which died as a result
of injuries to mother could not sue under common law tort). Accord, Norman v. Mur-
phy, 124 Cal.App.2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954).
29. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
30. Id. at 140. The decision implies that a liveborn who is capable of survival, whether
or not he survives, has a common law action for damages sustained at any time during
gestation. For a somewhat different interpretation of Bonbrest, see Rice, supra note 6, at
1072.
31. Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); Williams
v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949). See also Sox v.
United States, 187 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. S.C. 1960) (recovery for prenatal injuries allowed
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act).
Keyes distinguished Dietrich, discussed in note 28 supra, by noting that in Dietrich the
fetus was not born alive. By limiting the Dietrich holding to cases involving similar facts,
the Keyes court in effect limited recovery for prenatal injuries to liveborn infants. Courts
following Bonbrest and Keyes have permitted recovery for prenatal injuries. However,
recovery has been limited to injuries sustained during fetal viability, fixed at approxi-
mately the third trimester of gestation, when the fetus is capable of independent life. Kelly
v. Gregory, 282 App.Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953). That theory has undergone some
erosion in Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960), which allowed a liveborn
infant a right of action for injuries sustained at one month gestation. Illinois has also
rejected the viability distinction. See Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill.App.2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691
(1st Dist. 1961) (one month).
Because recovery is contingent upon live birth, it is illogical to further condition recov-
ery upon viability. If the child must carry the effects of prenatal injuries, it makes little
difference whether those injuries were sustained at one month gestation or at viability.
For a full discussion of viability, see notes 71-77 and accompanying text infra.
32. For a discussion of fetal interests in property, see notes 13-24 and accompanying
text supra.
33. Actions at common law did not survive the death of the plaintiff. Current survival
[Vol. 25:676
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The legal rationale for the distinction is clear. A fetus born after having
sustained injuries requires compensation during life as does a person
first bori and then injured. A fetus which is never born alive needs no
compensation. Thus, the law of torts clearly distinguishes between the
fetus and a person, permitting only the person to recover.
Wrongful Death
Wrongful death statutes have been enacted by each state to create a
cause of action in favor of the survivors of a decedent whose death
proximately resulted from injuries inflicted by a third-party tortfeasor .3
The action does not accrue to the decedent, rather, it accrues to and for
the sole benefit of the survivors after the death of the decedent. Origi-
nally, recovery was limited to actual pecuniary loss sustained by the
survivors." However, in the majority of jurisdictions the statute has
been expanded by judicial interpretation"6 to permit parental recovery
statutes create a right in the personal representative of the decedent to continue the action
as if the decedent had survived. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §339 (1975). However,
survival actions have never been brought on behalf of a fetus.
34. Wrongful death first appeared in England in the form of The Fatal Accidents Act
of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93, otherwise known as Lord Campbell's Act. Prior to that time,
the death of a human being could not be complained of in a civil court. Baker v. Bolton,
170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (N.P. 1808).
Most modem statutes are patterned after Lord Campbell's Act and create a new cause
of action for the death of the decedent in favor of the decedent's personal representative
for the exclusive benefit of certain designated persons. W. PRossER & J. WADE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 1088 (5th ed. 1971). Because wrongful death recovery is a creature
of statute, it falls within the jurisdiction of the legislature to grant, to withhold or to
restrict as it sees fit. Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal.App.2d 95, 99, 268 P.2d 178, 180 (3d
Dist. 1954).
35. It is believed that Lord Campbell's Act, The Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10
Vict., c. 93, limited damages to pecuniary loss sustained, because American statutes
patterned after the act have adopted this limitation. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF DAMAGES §93 (1935). In the case of wrongful death recovery for a deceased child,
courts have found an implied pecuniary loss in the form of services the child would have
rendered to the family unit. But see Baird v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 11 Ill.App.3d 264,
296 N.E.2d 365 (4th Dist. 1973) (recovery limited to provable pecuniary damages).
36. Some courts have awarded damages for the death of an unborn child without requir-
ing proof of pecuniary damages. See, e.g., Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill.2d 368,
304 N.E.2d 88 (1973). Some Alabama courts have interpreted the wrongful death statute
as providing damages in a purely punitive manner. See Magnussen v. Swan, 291 Ala. 151,
279 So.2d 422 (1973). However, others have expanded the statute to include compensation
for the survivors of an unborn child as well. Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So.2d 354
(Ala. 1974). See also 8 AKRON L. REV. 580 (1975). But see Norman v. Murphy, 124
Cal.App.2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (3d Dist. 1954), interpreting CAL. Civ. CODE §29 (West 1954)
to deny wrongful death recovery for the unborn in California.
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for the loss of an expected relational interest37 in the child the fetus
would have become. Because the death of a fetus may give rise to a cause
of action under the wrongful death statute, some authors have suggested
that the fetus is a person."' This characterization of the fetus is inaccur-
ate, for the true parties in interest under the statute are not the fetus,
but the survivors of the fetus. It is only to allow compensation to these
survivors for their loss that judicial interpretation has expanded the
definition of "deceased person" to include the stillborn fetus.3"
Unfortunately, the issue of parental recovery for the death of a fetus
has been clouded by uneven judicial application of the term "deceased
person."0 In those jurisdictions where wrongful death recovery is per-
mitted, compensation is almost universally conditioned upon the viabil-
ity of the fetus at the time of the injury.4 The use of a fetal viability
37. Under the relational interest theory, the parents of a child have a vested interest in
the relationship that they may expect to enjoy with that child throughout his life. See
Note, Abortion: The Father's Rights, 42 U.C[N.L.REv. 441 (1973). The theory has been
urged in opposition to wrongful death statutes which require live birth as a precondition
to recovery for subsequent death. Advocates maintain that unless the law says that fetal
life is without value, the incident of birth should be irrelevant to the issue of compensation
for the parents. Id. at 448-49.
38. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §55 (4th ed. 1971); E. PATTERSON,
LAW IN A SCIENTIFIC AGE 35 (1963); Louisell, supra note 15.
39. The Illinois Wrongful Death Statute is exemplary:
Every such action shall be brought by and in the names of the personal repre-
sentatives of such deceased person, and except as otherwise hereinafter pro-
vided, the amount recovered in every such action shall be for the exclusive
benefit of the surviving spouse ....
ii.L. REV. STAT, ch. 70, §2 (1975). The statute has been interpreted to permit recovery for
the death of an unborn child under the theory that the survivors have sustained as great
a loss as if the child had first been born and then died. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg,
55 Ill.2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973).
40. A number of jurisdictions refuse to recognize the survivors' right to compensation
absent live birth of the fetus prior to death. See, e.g., Arizona: Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz.
App. 552, 529 P.2d 706 (1974); California: Bayer v. Suttle, 23 Cal.App.3d 361, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 212 (1st Dist. 1972); Florida: Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So.2d 695 (Fla.
1968); Iowa: McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971); Mississippi: Occhi-
pinti v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 252 Miss. 172, 172 So.2d 186 (1965); New York: In re Logan's
Estate, 156 N.Y.S.2d 49, 4 Misc.2d 283, aff'd, 156 N.Y.S.2d 152, 2 App. Div.2d 842 (1956);
North Carolina: Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Oklahoma:
Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (Okla. 1967); Pennsylvania: Chlubicki v. Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co., 55 Luz.Leg.Reg. 133 (Pa.Com.Pl. 1964); Tennessee: Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn.
614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963); Texas: Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d
820 (Sup. Ct. Tex. 1967); Virginia: Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d
440 (1969). See note 41 infra for jurisdictions taking the opposite view.
41. Those jurisdictions which permit recovery for the death of a viable fetus are:
Alabama: Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So.2d 354 (Ala. 1974) (the purpose of the
[Vol. 25:676
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requirement is both illogical and untenable since the death of a fetus at
any time amounts to the permanent deprivation of a parental interest
in the expected child. The loss to the surviving parents is equal from
the beginning of gestation until live birth. Courts should acknowledge
this fact and abandon the fetal viability requirement. Wrongful death
statute is the preservation of life; therefore, live birth is not required); Alaska: Mace v.
Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962) (no recovery for a non-viable fetus, which may
imply that a remedy does exist at viability); District of Columbia: Simmons v. Howard
Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971) (failure to deliver live child at birth); Connecticut:
Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Delaware: Worgan v.
Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Georgia: Porter v. Lassiter, 91
Ga.App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955) ("quick" fetus); Illinois: Chrisafogeorgis v. Branden-
berg, 55 Ill.2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Indiana: Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 277
N.E.2d 20 (1971); Kansas: Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Kentucky:
Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1970); Louisiana: Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 50 So.2d 847 (La. App. 1951); Maryland: State v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d
71 (1964) (viable fetus is a person within Lord Campbell's Act and within the statute
authorizing actions by administrators); Massachusetts: Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975); Michigan: O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785
(1971) (involving an eight month old fetus); Minnesota: Pehrson v. Kistner, 222 N.W.2d
334 (Minn. 1974); Missouri: Action v. Shields, 386 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1965) (by implica-
tion); New Hampshire: Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957) (still-
born child entitled to recover in action for injuries sustained when viable); Ohio: Stidam
v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Oregon: Libbee v. Permanente
Clinic, 268 Ore. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974); South Carolina: Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C.
608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); West Virginia: Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.
W.Va. 1969); Washington: Moen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 266 (Wash. 1975); Wisconsin: Kwa-
terski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 34 Wis.2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
Nevada is the only state thus far which has allowed recovery for a pre-viable fetus.
White v. Yup, 458 F.2d 617 (Nev. 1969). One reason given for limiting wrongful death
recovery to survivors of viable fetuses is the difficulty in proving that the dead fetus was
alive at the time of the injury. Since the fetus is never born alive, plaintiff must supply
expert medical testimony from which the existence of fetal life and normal development
may be inferred. In addition, plaintiff must prove that the fetus was killed by the injury
alleged and not as a result of natural causes. Because of the necessarily speculative nature
of the opinion testimony presented, proof of proximate cause is often impossible. However,
the difficulty of proof alone should not absolutely foreclose the assertion of legal rights.
Nor should the risk of some spurious suits work an embargo or nullification of all claims.
Moen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 266, 268 (Wash. 1975).
The absurdity of conditioning recovery on the gestational age of the fetus may be seen
in the following examples. If a pre-viable fetus is injured and subsequently stillborn, there
is usually no action under wrongful death. However, if the fetus is injured and is subse-
quently born alive, to live for only a few minutes and then die, there is recovery for injury
to the person under tort. In both cases the loss to the parents is equal, yet only in the
latter instance may they recover for that loss. See Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331
N.E.2d 916, 920 (Mass. 1975) (Brauchut, J., dissenting) (if viability was not a require-
ment where the fetus survived its prenatal injury and was born alive, then viability
should not limit or condition the remedy in stillbirth cases).
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statutes are not intended to protect the fetus; rather, they seek to pro-
tect the survivors' interests in the fetus. The fiction that the stillborn
fetus is a "deceased person" is necessary only to achieve the statutory
purpose of compensating the survivors.
Aid to Families with Dependent Children
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program (AFDC) es-
tablished under Title IV of the Social Security Act,4" has as its purpose
the distribution of funds for the care of needy dependent children within
the family unit.43 The program is administered by the states under
standardized eligibility rules promulgated by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare.4 Under federal rules, a state must pay
benefits to all persons who qualify as eligible aid recipients.45 Some
states provide AFDC benefits to pregnant women without living chil-
dren,416 while other states deny such benefits on the theory that the
unborn are not yet dependent children. 7
As a result of the disparity, pregnant women in non-benefit states
42. Social Security Act §401, 42 U.S.C. §601 (1970).
43. The program permits needy children to stay in the home with a non-working mother
or other eligible relative(s). See President Roosevelt's Message to Congress recommending
passage of the legislation, H.R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (1935), and
Committee Reports in both Houses: S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1935);
H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935).
44. See 45 C.F.R. §233.90 (1975).
45. The supremacy clause prohibits states from establishing a standard which excludes
persons eligible under the act. See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend
v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). See also New York
State Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 423-24 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. §49.19 (4)(g) (Supp. 1976) (pregnant women are eligible
for aid six months prior to birth of a child). The Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, under its rulemaking power, 42 U.S.C. §1302 (1970), permits federal financial
participation for state payments made with regard to an unborn child when the fact of
pregnancy has been determined by medical diagnosis. 45 C.F.R. §233.90 (c)(2)(ii) (1975).
Although pregnant women may already be receiving aid under the Maternal and Child
Health Care Program of Title V of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §701 (1970), it may
very well be in the best interest of the state to supplement these payments with AFDC
benefits, since the subsequent burden of supporting the child is upon the state.
47. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §4-1.1 (1975); OHfo REV. CODE §5107.03 (Supp.
1975). Those courts which have refused to require AFDC payments to pregnant women
have alluded to Title V of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §701 (1970), as a sufficient
indication that Congress had already provided for the unborn and thus had no intention
to do so twice. See Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1974); Mixon v. Keller, 372
F. Supp. 51 (M.D. Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974); Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp.
1379 (N.D. Fla. 1974). See generally Note, Eligibility of the Unborn for A.F.D.C. Benefits:
Statutory and Constitutional Issues, 54 B.U. L. REV. 945 (1974).
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brought class actions seeking to compel AFDC payments during preg-
nancy. The lower courts split on whether such payments were required."
In Burns v. Alcala49 the Supreme Court resolved the issue. Limiting its
opinion to an interpretation of Title IV of the Social Security Act, the
Court found that Congress had used the word "child" in its ordinary
context to refer to an individual already born.50 Thus, the legislative
definition of "dependent children"5' could not support the inclusion of
the unborn. Because the fetus was not eligible for aid as a dependent
child, the Court concluded that no state could be required to provide
AFDC benefits to pregnant women.2
The fact that AFDC benefits may be denied prior to live birth of the
fetus is consistent with the legislative purpose of providing aid to the
dependent child. As interpreted in Alcala, the AFDC program gives the
fetus no rights. The program, like the law of property and torts, condi-
tions all rights and privileges upon live birth.
Criminal Law
The criminal law has never viewed the intentional killing of a fetus
as homicide unless the fetus was first born alive and then died.53 While
48. This split resulted from varying judicial interpretations of Congress's intent in its
use of the term "dependent children." Those courts which held that the unborn child is
entitled to AFDC benefits relied upon: 1) a presumption of eligibility in the absence of
specific exclusion, and 2) the consistency of inclusion with the stated purposes of AFDC.
See Carver v. Hooker, 369 F. Supp. 204, aff'd, 501 F.2d 1244 (1st Cir. 1974), vacated, 420
U.S. 1000 (1975); Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147, aff'd, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974);
Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ohio 1973). For courts which have denied
AFDC payments to pregnant women, see note 47, supra.
49. 420 U.S. 575 (1975).
50. Id. at 580-81.
51. When used in this part-
(a) The term "dependent child" means a needy child (1) who has been
deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence
from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living
with his father, mother, . . . in a place of residence maintained by one or more
of such relatives as his or their home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of
eighteen, or (B) under the age of twenty-one and. . . a student regularly attend-
ing school, college or university, or . .. a course of vocational or technical
training . . ..
42 U.S.C. §606(a) (1970).
52. The finding that the unborn child was not an eligible recipient within the definition
of "dependent child" effectively permits each state to determine whether it will offer
AFDC benefits to pregnant women. See note 46 supra.
53. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County, 2 Cal.3d 619, 470 P.2d 617,
87 Cal.Rptr. 481 (1970), in which the court refused to find the defendant guilty of murder,
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it is true that some feticides were punishable under both common law
and statute, the penalties were, without exception, less than those im-
posed for the killing of a person. For example, at common law, killing a
fetus before it had quickened 54 was without consequence;55 killing it after
quickening was sometimes a misdemeanor,56 at most a felony, 57 but
never murder. Thus, the criminal law has neither regarded nor protected
the fetus as a person. This legal distinction is also apparent in the
even where the evidence was clear that his actions had caused the death of the fetus. It
stated that the legislature had never intended to change the common law rule that re-
quired a live birth to evoke the protection of the homicide statute. See also Clarke v. State,
117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671 (1897); Passley v. State, 194 Ga. 327, 21 S.E.2d 230 (1942); State v.
Dickinson, 23 Ohio App. 259, 263 N.E.2d 253 (1970).
The proposition that the fetus cannot be the subject of homicide derives from the
common law. See, e.g., Regina v. Trilloe, 174 Eng. Rep. 674 (N.P. 1842); Regina v. Wright,
173 Eng.Rep. 1039 (N.P. 1841); Regina v. Reeves, 173 Eng. Rep. 724 (N.P. 1839); Rex v.
Sellis, 173 Eng. Rep. 370 (N.P. 1837). See also The Law and the Unborn Child, supra note
6, at 363 n.99. But see H. DE BRACTON, THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, III, ii, 4, quoted
and translated in Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of
the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411, 419
(1968):
If there be anyone who strikes a pregnant woman or gives her a poison whereby
he causes an abortion, if the foetus be already formed or animated, and espe-
cially if it be animated, he commits homicide,
However, no reported cases support Bracton's view, absent the occurrence of live birth and
subsequent death. The Law and the Unborn Child, supra note 6, at 362.
Part of the reason for the live birth requirement under the common law was the problem
of proof. Only if the infant were first born alive was it possible to determine whether death
resulted from a criminal as distinct from a natural cause. Rex v. Sims, 75 Eng. Rep. 1075
(K.B. 1601); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 29-30 (2d ed. 1969).
54. A quick child is "[olne that has developed so that it moves within the mother's
womb." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1415 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
55. If the killing of the fetus occurred during an abortion with the mother's consent,
there was no crime. If the killing occurred without her consent, the resulting offense was
assault and battery. W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES §292,
at 394 (5th ed. 1952). See also Smith v. Gaffard, 31 Ala. 45 (1857); Abrams v. Foshee, 3
Iowa 273.(1856); Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48 (1851); Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass.
263 (1845); State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52 (1849).
56. Under English statutes, any person who provided the means to produce an abortion
would be guilty of only a misdemeanor. Quay, Justifiable Abortion - Medical and Legal
Foundations, 49 GEO. L.J. 395, 432, 436 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Quay].
57. Id. at 432. The willful killing of an unborn child by any injury to the mother, which
would be murder if it resulted in the mother's death, is manslaughter. It seems clear that
the penalty is conditioned on the prospect or occurrence of an injury to the mother. See,
e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-2223 (1964); FLA. STAT. ANN. §782.09 (1965); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§559.090 (1953). See also F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW §517 (12th ed. 1932) (killing the
mother during an abortion was either murder in the second degree or manslaughter, while
killing the fetus was merely considered the perpetration of a criminal abortion).
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subsequently-enacted abortion statutes." In no case was the penalty for
wrongful abortion equivalent to that for murder. 9
Despite the fact that the abortion statutes treated the fetus as some-
thing less than a person, some authors assert that these statutes were,
in any event, primarily intended to protect the fetus."0 However, an
examination of the operation of these statutes indicates that the true
purpose was to protect the life and health of the mother from the un-
skilled abortionist.' Protection of the fetus was merely incidental. This
conclusion follows from the fact that, although some statutes provided
for prosecution of the pregnant woman if she either procured or per-
formed her own abortion,"2 there is no record of any such prosecution. If
the purpose of the statutes was protection of the fetus, logic would
demand prosecution of any person, including the mother, who was re-
sponsible for its death. But if, on the other hand, the purpose of the
statutes was the protection of the pregnant woman, then the state's
failure to prosecute her is consistent with the statutory intent.
Moreover, third-parties who procured or performed abortions were pro-
secuted, whether or not the woman was pregnant. 3 This fact further
58. For a complete history of English and American abortion statutes, see generally
Quay, supra note 56.
59. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§125.27, 125.45 (McKinney 1975) (murder in the first
degree is a class A-1 felony, punishable by death; criminal abortion in the first degree is
a class D felony, punishable by not more than seven years' imprisonment); Law of July
28, 1961, ch. 38, §23-1 [19611 Ill. Laws 1983 (repealed 1973) (murder is a separate offense
punishable by death; criminal abortion is punishable by one to ten years' imprisonment).
60. The Law and the Unborn Child, supra note 6, at 364; Constitutional Conception of
Life, supra note 6, at 1002.
61. See G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 453 (1957); Leavy &
Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding Laws, 35 S. CAL. L. REV.
123, 125 (1962).
62. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §275 (West 1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§125.50, 125.55
(McKinney 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-2 (1973). But see Destro, supra note 6, at 1256
n.30 (1975), citing In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 451, 67 A.2d 141, 145 (1949): "The rule proscrib-
ing prosecution [of the woman aborted] was . . . based upon evidentiary considerations:
the courts needed the woman's testimony to bring the abortionist before the bar." While
this rationale may in part account for the absence of prosecution of the patient, it cannot
explain the states' failure to prosecute a woman whose abortion is self-induced.
63. See, e.g., Law of July 28, 1961, ch. 38, §23-1, [1961] Ill. Laws 1983 (repealed 1973),
which provided in relevant part:
(a) A person commits abortion when he uses any instrument, medicine, drug
or other substance whatever, with the intent to procure a miscarriage of any
woman. It shall not be necessary in order to commit abortion that such woman
be pregnant or, if pregnant, that a miscarriage be in fact accomplished.
(emphasis added)
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demonstrates that the real purpose of the statutes was protection of the
woman."A
More modern abortion statutes, 5 although now obsolete,"6 offer addi-
tional indications of the law's regard for the fetus. They permitted ter-
mination of pregnancy under the following circumstances: 1) whenever
the pregnant woman's physical or mental health was endangered; 7 2)
whenever the fetus might be born with grave physical or mental
defects;"6 or 3) whenever pregnancy resulted from felonious intercourse.,
Clearly, none of these provisions protected the fetus, especially the last,
under which a fetus could be aborted solely because the circumstances
of its conception were socially disapproved. 6 In other words, the fetus
in and of itself had no interest in or right to life unless the state, the
mother and the physician were first in agreement. If at times the crimi-
nal law appears to offer its protection, it does so only incidentally to the
protection of persons. The criminal law, like the law of property, torts,
wrongful death and social welfare, gives the fetus neithe; rights nor
protection prior to live birth.
The analysis of the legal precedent in these five sections supports the
64. State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112 (1858), in which an abortionist who advised a
pregnant woman to swallow a substance was convicted of procuring a miscarriage, al-
though it could not be proved that the woman actually ingested the substance. Because
the statute was for the protection of the woman, it was unnecessary for the state to prove
that the substance was in fact taken.
65. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §230.3(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), which pro-
vides in relevant part:
(2) Justifiable Abortion, A licensed physician is justified in terminating a
pregnancy if he believes there is substantial risk that continuance of the preg-
nancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother or that
the child would be born with grave physical or mental defect, or that the preg-
nancy resulted from rape, incest, or other felonious intercourse.
66. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). These
cases effectively nullified all penal abortion statutes which limited or proscribed abortion
prior to the point of fetal viability (at approximately the twenty-eighth week of preg-
nancy).
67. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§274-76 (West 1972); GA. CODE §26-1202(a)(1972); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §14-451 (1967); ORE. REV. STAT. §435.415 (1969).
68. See, e.g., GA. CODE §26-1202(a)(1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-451 (1967); ORE. REV.
STAT. §435.415 (1969).
69. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§274-76 (West 1972); GA. CODE §26-1202(a)(1972); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §14-451 (1967); ORE. REV. STAT. §435.415 (1969).
70. It is clearly not in the best interests of the fetus to be aborted. Nor is there in this
case any countervailing danger to the pregnant woman in a continued pregnancy. Rather,
the fetus is aborted purely because of the public policy consideration of the state, and the
social and moral stigma attached to the woman who delivers a child resulting from rape,
incest or other felonious intercourse.
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Court's decision that the fetus is not a person. Just as this analysis is
essential to an acceptance of the proposed guidelines, so too is an under-
standing of the meaning of viability and the problems associated with
its determination.
VIABILITY AND LIVE BIRTH
The Supreme Court's choice of viability as the point at which the
state may intervene in the woman's exercise of her fundamental right
to abort was serious error. Although the Court set the upper limit of
viability at the beginning of the third trimester of pregnancy, after
approximately twenty-eight weeks," it failed to define the lower limit
of viability. Thus, Roe v. Wade allows the state to intervene and pro-
scribe elective abortions during the second trimester of pregnancy"
71. The Court, citing L. HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS (14th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as HELLMAN & PRITCHARD], stated:
Interpretations of the word "viability" have varied between fetal weights of 400
g [grams] (about 20 weeks of gestation) and 1,000 g (about 28 weeks of gesta-
tion). Since an infant reported by Monro that was said to weigh only 397 g
survived, on the basis of this single precedent, an infant weighing 400 g or more
may be regarded as capable of living. Although our smallest infant weighed 540
g at birth, survival even at 700 or 800 g is unusual. Attainment of a weight of
1,000 g is therefore widely, used as the criterion of viability. Infants below this
weight have little chance of survival, whereas those over 1,000 g have a substan-
tial chance, which increases greatly with each 100 g increment. Expert medical
care, furthermore, has permitted survival of increasingly small infants.
410 U.S. at 160 n.60.
The twenty-eight week point of viability is medically accepted because it marks the
period at which substantial fetal weight gain coincides with functionally complete devel-
opment. While a smaller fetus has some chance of survival, its actual viability is limited
to whether or not its lungs are fully mature and operational, usually at twenty-six to
twenty-eight weeks. Some physicians consider only those fetuses with functioning lungs
to be liveborn because fetuses without independent respiration capabilities cannot be
given respiratory support and so cannot take on oxygen; they die, often within hours of
birth. Cf. S. CLAYTON, D. FRASER & T. LEWIS, OBSTETRICS 645 (12th ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as CLAYTON, FRASER & LEWIS]. A suggested alternative to respiratory sustenance for
pre-twenty-six week liveborns is direct oxygenation of the bloodstream, but no such
method has yet been devised. Interview with Ervin E. Nichols, M.D., Director-Practice
Activities, The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Chicago, Illinois, on
Mar. 4, 1976 [hereinafter cited as Nichols]. For a discussion of attempted methods of
direct oxygenation of premature liveborns, see "Fetuses, Pregnant Women, and In Vitro
Fertilization" in Part III: Dep't of H.E. W., Protection of Human Subjects, 40 FED. REG.
33525, 33534 (1975).
72. See Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974) (since viability varies,
the state's interest in preserving fetal life may also vary). See also Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo.), application for stay of enforcement of Missouri
House Bill No. 1211 pending appeal granted, 420 U.S. 918 (1975) (subjective medical
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whenever there is evidence that the fetus is at least potentially viable."
This requires the physician to make two highly speculative determina-
tions. Not only must he attempt to determine the age of the fetus, he
must also decide whether or not it is viable.
A physician can rarely determine the exact gestational age of a fetus,
even during the third trimester of pregnancy, because his access to fetal
information is extremely limited and unreliable." His bases of inquiry
determination of viability, without regard to the trimester of gestation, is not invalid
although it may prevent abortions within the second trimester of pregnancy). But see
Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed for want of
jurisdiction sub nom. Spannaus v. Hodgson, 420 U.S. 903 (1975) (state statute which
places viability at twenty weeks in order to restrict abortion during the second trimester
of pregnancy is invalid; the period of viability is presumed to be no sooner than twenty-
four weeks unless individualized data indicate otherwise).
Realistically, current medical evidence would prevent the state's setting viability at a
point prior to the twentieth week. See note 73 infra.
73. Unfortunately, it is almost impossible'to determine fetal age and weight before the
fetus is removed from the uterus. In addition, fetal weight is very seldom closely correla-
tive of fetal age because of the variations in rates of fetal weight gain and development.
Nichols, supra note 71. For example, while HELLMAN & PRITCHARD, supra note 71, at 1027,
place 400 gram fetal weight at approximately twenty weeks of gestation, the University
of Illinois at the Medical Center reports a spontaneously aborted fetus of twenty-eight
weeks weighing only 300 grams. Interview with Marcia Mauer, Ass't. Prof. of Nursing,
University of Illinois at the Medical Center, Chicago, Illinois, on Mar. 5, 1976.
HELLMAN & PRITCHARD provides the following approximate fetal survival rates based on
single-birth weights:
Birth Weight in Grams Percent of Survival
401 [20 wks] - 1000 [28 wks] 4.1
1000 - 1500 52.2
1501 - 2000 81.6
2001 - 2500 96.2
2500+ 99.5
[full term 40 wks]
HELLMAN & PRITCHARD, supra note 71, at 680. For additional resource material on obste-
trics, see CLAYTON, FRASER & LEwis, supra note 71; M. GARREY, A. GOVAN, C. HODGE & R.
CAILANDER, OBSTETRICS ILLUSTRATED (2d ed. 1974); J. GREENHILL & E. FRIEDMAN, BIOLOGI-
CAl, PRINCIPLES AND MODERN PRACTICE OF OBSTETRICS (1974) [hereinafter cited as
GREENHII. & FRIEDMAN]; E. HUGHES, OBSTETRIc-GYNECOLOGIC TERMINOLOGY (1972)
[hereinafter cited as HUGHES]; J. WILLSON, C. BEECHAM & E. CARRINGTON, OBSTETRICS AND
GYNECOLOGY (5th ed. 1975). [hereinafter cited as WILLSON, BEECHAM & CARRINGTON].
74. Tests for calculating fetal age have been largely developed to aid physicians during
the last trimester of pregnancy in determining the best time to deliver by Cesarean
section. Nichols, supra note 71. These tests are therefore not geared to distinguish between
twenty-four and twenty-eight week second trimester fetuses, but rather to find gestational
age with accuracy at or after thirty-two to thirty-four weeks, when there is the best chance
of delivering a viable liveborn.
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are largely confined to maternal history and estimated uterus size.7 5
With regard to maternal history, the physician is entirely dependent
upon the mother's recollection of the date of conception, for he is usually
without independent knowledge."6 If the mother is either unable or un-
willing to provide this information, the physician must rely on a subjec-
tive evaluation of the size of the uterus in order to estimate fetal size
and thus weight. However, uterus size, even in combination with a
complete maternal history, only permits the physician to calculate ges-
tational age to within an accuracy of four to six weeks."
Some of the newer tests have greatly improved the accuracy of age determination in
the third trimester, especially when used in combination. For example, with amniocen-
tisis, an analysis of the cytologic and biochemical characteristics of the amniotic fluid, a
physician can predict fetal age by measuring the extent of certain chemical agents present.
After thirty-four weeks, creatin levels rise, indicating muscle maturity; after thirty-eight
weeks, increased lipid levels indicate liver development. Another useful tool is x-ray,
which can sometimes determine age as early as twenty-six weeks, although accuracy is
generally not recognized prior to thirty-eight weeks. GREENHILL & FRIEDMAN, supra note
73, at 171-76.
One of the newest and most significant testing methods is ultrasonography, which uses
sound waves bounced across the bi-parietal diameter of the fetus's head to measure growth
changes and so determine gestational age. Here, again, accuracy occurs only during the
third trimester, at about the thirty-second week. Prior to that time, measurement of the
fetal head is difficult due to unpredictable twisting and turning. As with many new age
determinant methods, sonography remains a research tool, limited in availability to only
terciary hospitals (large research or university-affiliated centers). Secondary (largely met-
ropolitan, suburban or medium central-city hospitals) and primary (rural, routine and
emergency facilities) centers have no practical access to such techniques.
75. Nichols, supra note 71.
76. The physician will usually have independent knowledge of maternal history only if
he has been treating the patient for infertility with hormones or if the patient has been
artificially inseminated. In either case, medical records narrow the possibilities of concep-
tion dates. Id. Even when the pregnancy has been "planned," the mother is often unable
to pinpoint the exact month of conception. For example, the pregnant woman may men-
struate after conception and so believe herself to be one month less pregnant than she
really is. Or the woman may be so irregular in her menstrual cycle that any determination
is at best speculative. This is most often true in cases of very young patients who have
only recently begun, or have not yet in fact begun, menstruating.
In addition to being unable to provide accurate information, the woman may be unwill-
ing to do so. If she believes that she is beyond the time limit for a legal abortion in the
second trimester, she may lie to obtain the abortion. Clark, Gosnell & Cook, A New
Doctors' Dilemma, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 3, 1975, at 25 [hereinafter cited as Clark, Gosnell &
Cookl.
77. Nichols, supra note 71. Intrauterine growth charts indicate generally wide weight
ranges for the normal-weight fetus. Small or large-for-age fetuses may vary even more
widely. See note 73 supra. Thus, a uterus which feels like it contains a 500 gram, twenty-
two week non-viable fetus may actually contain a viable fetus of twenty-eight to thirty-
two weeks.
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Despite the difficulties and inherent imprecision in determining fetal
age, the physician who errs and aborts a potentially viable second tri-
mester fetus may be liable for an illegal abortion and subject to criminal
prosecution." At least two states have already brought criminal charges
under just such circumstances." These actions have prompted some
78. See, e.g., Ir.t.. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §81-17 (1975) (an abortion performed in violation
of this section is a Class 2 felony).
79. The most publicized criminal prosecution of a physician relating to abortion is the
case of Commonwealth v. Edelin, No. 81823 (Suffolk Cty. Super. Ct.), appeal docketed,
No. AC75-604 (Mass. Intermediate App. Ct. 1975). Dr. Edelin was indicted and subse-
quently convicted of manslaughter for the killing of an unborn viable fetus in the womb
of its mother during a hysterotomy abortion, For a full discussion of abortion procedures,
see note 11 infra. The prosecution alleged that the fetus was twenty-four to twenty-eight
weeks of age, had exhibited life signs within the mother and was ultimately smothered
inside the mother by Dr. Edelin. The defense elicited testimony from Edelin's medical
associates which placed the age of the fetus variously at twenty to twenty-two weeks,
twenty-four weeks, and twenty-five to twenty-seven weeks. After removal, the fetus
weighed between 600 and 700 grams. Wecht, A Comparison of Two Abortion-Related
Legal Inquiries, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 36, 37-40 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Wecht].
The Edelin case might have presented a good setting in which to determine the liability
of a physician who in good faith fails to determine accurately second trimester fetal age
or viability, who aborts a viable fetus which is subsequently liveborn, and who either fails
to sustain the liveborn's life or takes affirmative action to kill the liveborn after delivery.
Unfortunately, none of these issues was reached because Edelin was not prosecuted for a
wrongful abortion, but rather for the killing of a person. The prosecution did not charge
Edelin with wrongful abortion because at the time of the act, the Massachusetts statute
was inoperative as a result of the Roe v, Wade decision. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 272,
§19 (1970). Therefore, the prosecution charged that Edelin had killed a person, alive inside
the body of the mother, and was guilty of the crime of manslaughter. Such a charge can
have no legal basis unless the fetus is first born alive outside the body of the mother and
then killed. Prior to expulsion, the fetus is not a person under either the common or
statutory law. See text accompanying notes 13-70 supra. See also note 82 infra. The trial
judge recognized this as law and instructed the jury that
A fetus is not a person, and not the subject of an indictment for manslaughter.
In order for a person to exist he or she must be born .. . .Birth is the process
which causes the emergence of a new individual from the body of its mother.
Once outside the body of its mother, the child has been born within the com-
monly accepted meaning of that word . . . .In order for the defendant to be
found guilty in this case, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, ...
that the defendant caused the death of a person who had been born alive outside
the body of his or her mother.
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion that the Court Order the
Verdict Set Aside, for Order of the Entry of a Verdict of Not Guilty, or, in the Alternative,
for a New Trial 1-2, citing Record, vol. 29, at 55-56, Commonwealth v. Edelin, No. 81823
(Suffolk Cty. Super. Ct. 1975).
The jury found Edelin guilty of manslaughter. It apparently disregarded the judge's
instructions requiring that the fetus be liveborn to convict Edelin of manslaughter, and
instead accepted the prosecution's theory that a fetus which exhibits life signs inside the
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physicians and hospitals to refuse to perform non-therapeutic abortions
beyond the twentieth week of pregnancy,"0 even though the possibility
of viability is highly unlikely until at least the twenty-sixth week. If fear
of criminal prosecution induces a significantly greater number of doctors
and hospitals to adopt such twenty week abortion policies, the availabil-
ity of late second trimester abortions will be seriously restricted, and the
right of a pregnant woman to abort after twenty weeks will be effectively
precluded. Under such blanket policies, whether or not a fetus is viable
after the twentieth week will be irrelevant, for no individual determina-
tion will be made. Instead, the fiction of twenty week fetal viability will
be an irrebuttable presumption used to deprive the pregnant woman 1
of her fundamental right to abort a fetus which, in all probability, is not
viable.
Determining viability is not the sole problem facing the physician. In
addition, he must deal with the reality of live birth following abortion.
Live birth occurs when any fetus, regardless of age, is removed from its
mother's womb 2 and exhibits independent breathing, with movement
mother before expulsion is a person. Under these circumstances, it was clearly the obliga-
tion of the trial court to set aside the jury's verdict; this he refused to do. The verdict is
now on appeal.
For a similar case with a markedly different result, see In re: Formal Open Inquest into
the Death of Baby Girl Doe, Coroner's Hearing, Allegheny County, Pa. (1974), discussed
in Wecht, supra, at 40-42.
80. See American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Abortion Clinic Directory (Oct.
1975). The Los Angeles Planned Parenthood office reported a ten percent increase in the
number of women coming in because doctors and hospitals had refused to abort them after
the sixteenth or seventeenth week of pregnancy. Alpern, supra note 12, at 24. In the entire
midwestern area of the United States there are reportedly only four Chicago hospitals
which continue to perform non-therapeutic second trimester abortions, and these only at
a combined rate of approximately fifteen per week. Interview with Faculty, Dep't of
Maternal-Child Nursing, University of Illinois at the Medical Center, Chicago, Illinois,
on Mar. 5, 1976 [hereinafter cited as Nursing Faculty]. Thus, abortion, at least after the
first trimester, is practically unavailable in the midwest.
81. The majority of late-term abortions are performed on single, young, poor and minor-
ity women. As stated by Dr. James Waters, Jr., a plaintiff in the 1973 Roe v. Wade case,
The fact that a patient gets to eighteen weeks means she has difficulty making
up her mind, she has economic problems, she's not smart enough to know she's
pregnant, and she's scared to death to tell her family.
Alpern, supra note 12, at 23.
82. Complete expulsion from the mother's body has usually been a legal requisite of live
birth. See Jackson v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 295, 96 S.W.2d 1014 (1936); People v.
Hayner, 300 N.Y. 171, 90 N.E.2d 23 (1949); Cordes v. State, 54 Tex. Crim. 204, 112 S.W.
943 (1904). See also Atkinson, Life, Birth and Live Birth, 20 L.Q. Rpv. 134, 139-46 (1904).
But see People v. Chavez, 77 Cal.App.2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (4th Dist. 1947) (a fetus fatally
wounded during the birth process which died after total expulsion is a person for purposes
of the homicide statute).
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of the arms and legs, a beating heart, or pulsation of the umbilical cord,
denoting heart action."3 Live birth may occur as early as twenty weeks,
when the fetus has less than a .001 percent chance of survival due to the
immaturity of its respiratory system.84 Thus, live birth is not indicative
of fetal viability; it may ante-date viability and actual capability of
survival by as much as eight weeks.85 However, the fact of live birth, no
matter how fleeting the life signs, is of significance in that it marks the
beginning of independent legal personality." For the duration of life, the
liveborn is entitled to the rights and privileges enjoyed by other persons
under the law. For example, upon live birth the fetus's contingent right
to take property becomes vested" and he may have an action brought
in his own name to recover for tortious injuries sustained during gesta-
tion." In the event of his subsequent death, the liveborn infant is treated
as a deceased person in all respects. Therefore, if death results from
tortious injuries, the personal representative of the liveborn may bring
a survival action for the benefit of the liveborn's estate." If death results
from a criminal act or omission, the state may prosecute for the killing
of a human being under homicide statutes. 0
83. WILLSON, BEECHAM & CARRINGTON, supra note 73, at 8. However, "fh]eartbeats are
to be distinguished from several transient cardiac contractions; respirations are to be
distinguished from fleeting respiratory efforts or gasps ... " HUGHES, supra note 73, at
454.
To many hospitals, doctors and nurses, live birth means that the fetus has exhibited
any one of the indicated life signs, for example, a fetal heart tone, whether or not the
fetus has an actual capability to survive. Nursing Faculty, supra note 80. The capability
to survive requires at the minimum that the fetus have a functional respiratory system
so that it can be attached to a respirator for life support if necessary. See note 71 supra.
Clearly, a fetus can exhibit life signs although it is physically incapable of survival; that
is, it can be liveborn but not viable. Because a fetus cannot survive absent respiratory
capability, some physicians refuse to recognize live birth without fetal respiration. Ni-
chols, supra note 71. Such characterization of live birth indicates that some physicians
do not distinguish between live birth and viability, while others view them as two very
separate concepts.
84. See notes 71, 73 supra.
85. Viability requires functional lungs, which usually do not develop in the fetus until
twenty-six to twenty-eight weeks into gestation. Therefore, the fetus born alive between
twenty and twenty-six weeks is almost never viable. Nichols, supra note 71.
86. See text accompanying notes 13-70 supra.
87. See notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra.
88. See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra.
89. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
90. In a prosecution for homicide, the state must prove not only that the fetus was
completely expelled, but also that it was independent and separate in existence from the
mother when it was killed. See Montgomery v. State, 202 Ga. 678, 44 S.E.2d 242 (1947);
State v. O'Neall, 79 S.C. 571, 60 S.E. 1121 (1907); Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 417, 256
S.W. 433 (1923). But see Commonwealth v. Edelin, No. 81823 (Suffolk Cty. Super. Ct.
1975), discussed in note 79 supra.
[Vol. 25:676
ABORTION DECISION
The viability/live birth distinction is of immense significance in the
issue of state regulation of abortion, for it permits the state to treat the
physician's good faith act of aborting what he reasonably believes to be
a non-viable second trimester fetus in vastly different ways. The Roe
decision itself gives the state the limited power to regulate and punish
only for the abortion of viable fetuses." However, state statutes supple-
ment that power by providing a sanction for killing any fetus first born
alive. " Thus, whether the product of an abortion is a stillborn fetus or
a liveborn infant has serious criminal implications. Assuming that the
physician has made a good faith determination of the gestational age of
the fetus and reasonably believes it to be non-viable, his act of aborting
that fetus may produce three legally inconsistent results. If the fetus is
non-viable and dies during the abortion prior to expulsion from the
mother's womb, then there has been a legal abortion and no crime. If,
despite the physician's good faith determination to the contrary, the
fetus is viable and it dies prior to expulsion, then the state may prose-
cute for a wrongfully performed abortion.93 On the other hand, if a fetus
is aborted and subsequently born alive, then viability is legally irrele-
vant. If the physician fails to take affirmative action to preserve the life
of the liveborn94 or if he acts to cause its premature death, the state may
91. 410 U.S. at 164-65. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
92. See generally notes 53-70 and accompanying text supra.
93. See note 78 supra.
94. Whether or not a physician should take affirmative action to preserve a liveborn
aborted fetus is the subject of both ethical and moral debate. The Executive Board of The
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, in a recent policy statement of
ethical considerations relating to abortion, affirmed its official position that the physician
does not have an adversary relationship with the fetus and
. . . does not view the destruction of the fetus as an end in itself. The College
consequently recognizes a continuing obligation on the part of the physician
towards the survival of a fetus born alive following a procedure for abortion, and
where this can be achieved without additional hazard to the health of the
mother.
Some Ethical Considerations in Abortion, The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, Oct. 27, 1975, on file at The American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists, Chicago, Illinois.
Eighteen states, by statute, now require physicians to use extraordinary measures to
preserve the life of the liveborn. A Review of State Abortion Laws Enacted Since January
1973, 4 FAM. PI.AN./PoP. RPTR. 108, 113 (1975). What affirmative action, if any, is appropri-
ate when an aborted fetus is born alive is largely dependent upon the age, weight and
physical development of the liveborn. For example, a fetus so small and immature as to
be without the capability of respiration cannot survive. See notes 71, 73, 83 supra. In such
a case, affirmative action merely requires that the liveborn be made comfortable in a
warm incubator until its lungs begin to function or it eventually expires from lack of
oxygen. On the other hand the live birth of a viable fetus with functional lungs requires
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prosecute him for the intentional or negligent criminal killing of a per-
son.
9 5
The three disparate results which stem from the same fact situation
are absurd. In each case, the physician has made a good faith determi-
nation regarding viability and has performed the abortion upon that
premise. However, the law disregards the physician's good faith and
instead considers only the condition of the fetus after expulsion from the
mother. It then imposes liability on the physician as if he knew or could
have known the condition of the fetus when it was in the womb."
Clearly, the parameters established by the United States Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade have created substantial problems for the preg-
nant woman and her physician. In order to minimize these problems and
to implement satisfactorily the Roe decision, new guidelines incorporat-
ing both medical and legal realities are suggested in the following sec-
tion.
SUGGESTED GUIDELINES
The proposed guidelines seek to secure the woman's fundamental
more sophisticated assistance, including intravenous feeding and a respirator, if neces-
sary.
Equipment and resources are often limited. Many times only one or two respirators are
available for all prematurely born infants. Under these circumstances, which liveborn
receives what treatment becomes a matter of physician discretion. This is sometimes
known as the "triage". theory. Those who cannot survive are made as comfortable as
possible and left to die; those who will survive regardless of treatment receive minimal
care; only those whose survival depends upon treatment receive extraordinary aid. Ni-
chols, supra note 71. To allow non-viable liveborns to die may seem inhumane; however,
to permit viable liveborns to perish because necessary equipment is being used to tempo-
rarily prolong the life of an aborted fetus which cannot be viable is absurd.
Incident to the live birth of a fetus is the question of who is to assume the financial
responsibility of its care and custody. Thus far six states have enacted legislation which
makes an aborted fetus born alive a ward of the state, on the theory that it is a dependent
or neglected child. 4 FAM. PIAN./POP. RPTR., supra, at 113.
95. The liveborn, regardless of age or condition, is a person, the unexcused killing of
whom is a criminal offense. See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
96. In order to combat the inequity of divergent legal results for the killing of a non-
viable fetus, one author has suggested that the physician could avoid criminal liability
by administering a toxic substance to the fetus during the abortion. He states that while
such a recommendation "may be morally and theologically reprehensible to many physi-
cians, nevertheless [iti would appear to be prophylactically sound from a legal stand-
point, based upon the Laufe and Edelin cases." Wecht, supra note 79, at 44. As recognized
by Dr. Wecht, the difference in legal liability for the killing of a non-viable fetus either
inside or outside the womb is grounded in a mere cosmetic distinction. In both cases the
fetus is killed. However, in the former, fetal death is silent, unobtrusive and sanctioned.
In the latter, it is highly visible, emotionally and morally unsettling, and clearly criminal.
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right to abort a non-viable fetus by protecting the physician from un-
warranted prosecution. First, they provide notice to the physician of
what constitutes good faith in performing an abortion and when he can
be held liable for error. In addition, they recognize that the medical
definition of abortion does not require the purposeful destruction of the
fetus, but only its expulsion or extraction from the body of the pregnant
woman." Moreover, they acknowledge the practical difficulties inherent
in assessing gestational age and viability prior to the thirty-second week
of pregnancy." Finally, the proposed guidelines recognize the state's
interest in both the liveborn aborted fetus9 and the potential of life in
the viable fetus. They permit the state the greatest possible leeway in
safeguarding its interests, while still preserving the woman's right to an
abortion.
1. Good Faith
1.1 The good faith professional judgment of a physician shall be
an absolute defense to any action, either criminal or civil, brought
with respect to any matter pertaining to abortion.
Comment: This provision confronts the problem inherent in the con-
cept of fetal viability: the inevitable margin of physician error. It recog-
nizes that abortion involves medical decisions which can best be made
by a physician, and that these decisions are not appropriate subjects for
adversary legal proceedings which occur after the fact.""0 The defense is
intended to protect the physician who makes any good faith decision,
including one which concerns age or condition of the fetus, medical
condition of the mother, or choice of an abortion procedure. For exam-
ple, a physician's good faith determination that a fetus is non-viable will
be an absolute defense to any criminal or civil proceeding, even if the
aborted fetus is subsequently determined to have been viable. The phy-
sician has acted in good faith if he has utilized the information and
97. HUGHES, supra note 73, at 452; accord, GREENHILL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 73, at
185. See also note 94 supra. Many physicians, however, believe that the decision to termi-
nate a pregnancy by abortion must realistically be viewed as a decision to sacrifice the
fetus, because removal from the womb prior to the third trimester will almost certainly
produce a fetus which is either stillborn or incapable of survival. Nichols, supra note 71.
98. See note 74 supra.
99. See notes 71, 73, 83 supra.
100. These guidelines will ultimately suggest that the Court refrain from attempting
to second-guess a physician's good faith determination of gestational age and fetal viabil-
ity for purposes of abortion, and that it instead defer to the expertise of the medical
profession. Cf. H. HART & A. SACKS, Preface to the LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW at iii (tent. ed. 1958).
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techniques commonly available to and in use by the medical com-
munity. '"0
1.2 The good faith defense (1.1) shall not be available to a
physician who aborts a fetus which he knows, or in the exercise
of good faith professional judgment should have known, was viable
at the time of the abortion.
Comment: This provision denies the good faith defense to a physi-
cian who either negligently or intentionally fails to comply with ac-
cepted medical practices.
1.3 A physician who aborts a fetus which he knows, or in the
exercise of good faith professional judgment should have known,
was viable at the time of the abortion may be subject to such civil
or criminal liabilities as the state may prescribe.
Provided, the physician shall not be liable for the killing of a
person if the abortion did not produce a liveborn infant.
Comment: This provision will allow the state a remedy against the
physician who negligently or knowingly and intentionally aborts a viable
fetus in contravention of professional guidelines and state law. However,
this provision does not permit the state to ignore the United States
Supreme Court ruling that the fetus is not a person.' That is, while the
state may prosecute the physician for wrongful abortion of a viable
fetus, it may not prosecute for the killing of a person unless the aborted
fetus was first born alive and then killed. 0 3
2. Phase I - First Twenty Weeks
2.1 During the first twenty weeks inclusive of pregnancy, the
fetus is conclusively presumed to be non-viable.
Comment: This phase encompasses the first trimester of pregnancy
and the first half of the second trimester. These two periods were com-
101. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has already established
some policy guidelines relating to first trimester abortions which, if complied with, would
evidence good faith professional standards. For example,
1. Verification of the diagnosis and duration of pregnancy.
3. Recorded pre-operative [abortion] history and physical examination, par-
ticularly directed to identification of pre-existing or concurrent illnesses or drug
sensitivities that may have a bearing on the operative procedures ....
Statement on Abortion, The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, as
amended June 20, 1974, on file at The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, Chicago, Illinois.
102. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 157, 158, 161, 162.
103. See note 53 supra.
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bined for practicality and convenience because the interests of the
mother (2.2) and the state (2.3) are uniform throughout. 14 The non-
viability of the fetus is conclusively presumed based upon medical evi-
dence that no fetus below this age has ever survived outside the mother's
womb. ")-
2.2 The pregnant woman, in consultation with her physician, has
an unrestricted right to abort a fetus during this phase.
Comment: This provision recognizes the Roe v. Wade determination
that a state has no interest in the potential of life in a fetus prior to
viability, and so may not limit the woman's choice to abort.0 0
2.3 The state may regulate the medical abortion procedure and
abortion facilities to the extent necessary to protect the health and
well-being of the pregnant woman.
Comment: The state has an interest in the health and well-being of
all of its citizens. Therefore, it may regulate abortion to the extent
procedurally necessary to protect the pregnant woman, but not so as to
limit her decision or choice to abort. Regulation of abortion must be
similar to state health regulation of other medical procedures, practices
and facilities.
3. Phase II - Twenty-One to Twenty-Eight Weeks
3.1 From the twenty-first week through the twenty-eighth week
of pregnancy, the conclusive presumption of fetal non-viability
continues.
Comment: This provision is designed to minimize speculation about
fetal viability during the last half of the second trimester of pregnancy. 7
104. The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade held that a woman has a fundamental right
to abort which may be limited by a compelling state interest only at the point of fetal
viability. The Court delineated its trimester guidelines as follows:
First trimester (up to and including the twelfth week of pregnancy): The state may not
restrict the woman's right to abort. The decision to abort is made by the woman in
consultation with her physician.
Second trimester (from the thirteenth through approximately the twenty-eighth week
of pregnancy): The state may not restrict the woman's right to abort a non-viable fetus;
however, it may regulate hospital facilities to the extent necessary to protect the health
and well-being of the woman. The decision to abort is still solely within the province of
the woman and her physician.
Third trimester (from approximately the twenty-ninth week of pregnancy until full
term): The state's interest in the potential life of the viable fetus becomes compelling, and
it may therefore limit or proscribe all non-therapeutic abortions. The woman's right to
abort is secondary to the interest of the state. 410 U.S. at 164-65.
105. See notes 71, 73 supra.
106. See note 104 supra.
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While the fetus may be viable toward the end of this phase, the medi-
cally documented incidence of survival is almost negligible. 08 The pre-
sumption reflects the fact that the medical profession generally does not
recognize viability prior to the end of the twenty-eighth week of gesta-
tion.19
3.2 The pregnant woman, in consultation with her physician, re-
tains the unrestricted right to an abortion during this phase.
Comment: Because of the continued presumption of non-viability,
the state may not intervene in the decision made by the pregnant
woman and her physician. See Comment to 2.2.
3.3. The state may continue to regulate the medical abortion pro-
cedure and abortion facilities to the extent necessary to protect the
health and well-being of the pregnant woman,
Comment: This provision reaffirms the continuing interest of the
state in the health and well-being of its citizens. Again, however, the
state medical regulation may not infringe upon the pregnant woman's
choice or decision to abort.
3.4 The state may regulate the methods by which an abortion may
be performed, including the prescription of certain medically rec-
ognized methods which in and of themselves do little or no harm to
the fetus.
Provided, the prescribed method(s) has been adequately tested, is
recognized as both safe and effective by the medical profession, and
is readily available to the profession at large, and
Further provided, the method(s) poses no greater risk to the
health and well-being of the pregnant woman than other methods
generally in use.
107. See notes 71, 73, 83 supra.
108. A fetus which weighs 1000 grams (at approximately twenty-eight weeks) or less has
only a 4.1 percent rate of survival outside the womb. HELLMAN & PRITCHARD, supra note
71, at 680. See notes 71, 73 supra.
By conclusively presuming fetal non-viability prior to the end of the twenty-eighth
week, the guidelines seek to eliminate the absurdity of requiring a physician to speculate
upon an already speculative determination. That is, if a physician in good faith places
the approximate age of a fetus at twenty-six weeks, he should not then be required to
speculate further as to whether or not that particular fetus may be viable. While the
Supreme Court ideal may be individualized viability determinations for purposes of late
second trimester abortions, the practicalities of ascertaining gestational age permit a
knowledgeable approximation at best. See notes 71, 73 supra. To hold the medical profes-
sion to a higher standard is irrational.
109. HELLMAN & PRITCHARD, supra note 71, at 493 n.58.
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Comment: This provision recognizes the state's interest in the
health and well-being of all of its citizens, including the liveborn aborted
fetus who becomes a ward of the state."" See Comment to 3.5. Therefore,
the state may prescribe abortion methods which are most likely to pro-
duce healthy liveborns."1
110. Eight states, including Illinois, automatically make the aborted liveborn a public
ward. However, most states permit exceptions for abortions performed to save the life or
health of the mother and for parents who agree in advance of the abortion, or shortly
thereafter, to assume responsibility for the liveborn. 4 FAM. PLAN./PoP. RPTR., supra note
94, at 112. This legitimate state interest in the health and well-being of the liveborn ward
was also recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575
(1975). See notes 48 & 52 and accompanying text supra.
111. During the second trimester of pregnancy, three abortion methods are prevalent.
In the hypertonic saline amnio-infusion method (saline), amniotic fluid is partially re-
moved from the amniotic cavity, and 200 ml [milliliters] of twenty percent sodium
chloride is injected into the amniotic sac. Within several hours, significant physiological
changes occur within the body of the pregnant woman, usually culminating in active labor
and abortion in approximately thirty-six to forty hours. The fetus and placenta then
deliver spontaneously. Unfortunately, serious complications may result in a significant
number of cases, often requiring active intervention by the physician to save the life of
the pregnant woman. In the event of failed labor, a second or even third injection may be
necessary. ACOG [The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologistsl Technical
Bulletin, No. 37-Feb. 1976, on file at The American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists, Chicago, Illinois.
If repeated saline injections fail, resort to hysterotomy may be advisable. Since the
morbidity associated with hysterotomy is higher than that for other methods of abortion,
this procedure is usually employed only when other methods are inappropriate, WILLSON,
BEECHAM & CARRINGTON, supra note 73, at 200, or when sterilization by tubal ligation is
to be performed simultaneously. GREENHILL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 73, at 388. The hyster-
otomy procedure is similar to a Cesarean delivery in that the physician makes an incision
in the uterus, detaches the placenta from the uterine wall and removes the fetus. Clark,
Gosnell & Cook, supra note 76, at 24.
The newest, safest and most effective second trimester abortion method involves the
use of Prostaglandin F,, administered (like the saline solution) by the intra-amniotic
route. With Prostaglandin, the period of labor is reduced from approximately thirty-six
hours to less than twenty-four hours, and destructive physical changes which occur in the
pregnant woman with saline are bypassed. Anderson, Prostaglandin us Saline for Mid-
trimester Abortion, 4 CONTEMP. OB/GYN 91 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Anderson]. The
only currently recognized disadvantage of Prostaglandin is a higher incidence of minor
gastrointestinal side effects, such as vomiting and diarrhea. ACOG Technical Bulletin,
No. 27-Apr. 1974, on file at The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
Chicago, Illinois. Failed abortion, although rare, should be completed by other means,
e.g., a hysterotomy. Id. For extended discussion and evaluation of clinical results obtained
with the use of Prostaglandin F,,, see Corson & Bolognese, Intra-Amniotic Prostaglan-
din F, 0 as a Midterm Abortifacient: Effect of Oxytocin and Laminaria, 14 J. REPROD.
MED. (No. 2) 47 (1975); Corson, Bolognese & Merola, Intra-Amniotic Prostaglandin F a
to Induce Midtrimester Abortion, 117 AM. J. OB/GYN 27 (1973).
Of the three methods discussed, the saline method is least likely to produce a liveborn
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However, the state's power to prescribe abortion methods is strictly
limited to those methods which are acceptable to the medical com-
munity at large and which are also readily available to members of that
community."' If a state were permitted to prescribe outside these nar-
row restrictions, it might effectively restrain the pregnant woman's ac-
cess to a safe and effective abortion."' This provision is not intended to
prohibit or discourage the development of safer and more effective abor-
tion techniques.
The final proviso recognizes that a given drug or procedure, while safe
and effective for the majority of pregnant women, may pose a threat to
the life or health of a particular woman. In that case, her physician may
elect to use an alternate procedure, despite the propensity of that proce-
dure to produce a stillborn or badly damaged livebom infant."4 If the
because it upsets the physiology of the fetus during the process of abortion. The incidence
of survival among saline-aborted fetuses weighing between 600 and 700 grams is approxi-
mately 1.4 per 100,000. ACOG Technical Bulletin, No. 37-Feb. 1976, on file at The
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Chicago, Illinois. With hystero-
tomy, the number of live births increases, but because of the high maternal morbidity
rate, this method is not favored for routine, second trimester abortions. Prostaglandin is
the only method which is likely to produce an aborted liveborn without damage, aside
from that normally sustained during delivery, because it does not in and of itself upset
the physiology of the fetus. The fact that Prostaglandin also does not upset the physiology
of the mother makes this method the overwhelming choice of physicians who have access
to the drug for second trimester abortions. Nichols, supra note 71.
112. Both saline and hysterotomy are widely acknowledged and accepted procedures.
Prostaglandin has been only recently developed and tested. Anderson, supra note 111, at
91. Prostaglandin is currently available only in limited quantities and only in terciary
facilities. See note 74 supra.
113. Were a state at the present time to prescribe the exclusive use of Prostaglandin
for abortions without regard to its limited availability, the state would be unreasonably
restricting the pregnant woman's access to abortion. A similar attempt by the Common-
wealth of Kentucky to limit access to abortion by proscribing the saline method, without
an accepted alternate method of second trimester pregnancy termination, was held uncon-
stitutional in Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974). See also Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo.), application for stay of enforcement
of Missouri House Bill No. 1211 pending appeal granted, 420 U.S. 918 (1975). However,
it would seem that the state could, consistent with these guidelines, prefer Prostaglandin
Fa for abortion where it is available.
114. Any abortion method is unsafe for some pregnant women because of a particular
body condition, chemical balance or previous abortion experience. For example, the saline
method is not recommended for use in women in whom labor should not be induced, or
in women who cannot handle a forty gram salt load. ACOG Technical Bulletin, No.
37-Feb. 1976, on file at The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Chi-
cago, Illinois. Prostaglandin is contraindicated in the presence of acute pelvic inflamma-
tory disease or when hypersensitivity to the drug itself exists. Warning Insert, The Upjohn
Company, Kalamazoo, Michigan (Oct. 1973). Hysterotomy is contraindicated whenever
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election is made in good faith, the physician will have a defense to all
actions brought against him. (1.1)
3.5 The state may regulate medical procedure concerning- the live-
born aborted fetus, and take all steps it deems necessary to sustain
the health and well-being of the liveborn.
Provided, the state shall assume sole financial responsibility for
the care of the liveborn and shall not shift the burden of financial
responsibility to the woman who has chosen to abort the liveborn.
Comment: This provision acknowledges the common law rule that
a liveborn infant is a person for all purposes under the law. Thus, the
state may regulate medical procedure to the extent necessary to preserve
the health and well-being of the liveborn. 15 If the state chooses to exer-
cise its power to regulate, it must assume the financial burden incident
to such regulation, because the aborted liveborn has realistically become
a ward of the state."56
4. Phase III - Twenty-Nine Weeks to Term
4.1 After the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy, the fetus is con-
clusively presumed to be viable.
Comment: This phase encompasses the entire third trimester of
pregnancy, during which viability is most likely.1 7
4.2 The pregnant woman's access to elective abortions may be
restricted or even totally proscribed by the state during this phase.
Provided, a state may neither restrict nor proscribe abortion
when the life or health of the pregnant woman may be threatened
by a continued pregnancy.
Comment: This provision recognizes the state's compelling interest
in the potential of life in the viable fetus. If the state so chooses, it may
further that interest by proscribing all non-therapeutic abortions."'
However, when the life or health of the mother is threatened by contin-
ued pregnancy, the state's interest in potential life may not supersede
its duty to protect the life and health of the pregnant woman. This
limitation on state proscription of abortion is consistent with the com-
mon law concept that a fetus is not entitled to the rights, privileges and
protections accorded living persons. It is also consistent with many pre-
other less dangerous methods are appropriate and available. WILLSON, BEECHAM &
CARRINC.TON, supra note 73, at 200.
115. See note 94 supra.
116. See note 110 supra.
117. See note 71 supra.
118. See note 8 supra.
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Roe criminal statutes which permitted abortion when continued preg-
nancy threatened the life or health of the pregnant woman." 9
CONCLUSION
A woman's exercise of her fundamental right to abortion prior to fetal
viability is dependent upon her access to a physician who is willing to
perform the abortion. If significant numbers of physicians refuse to per-
form second trimester abortions because they fear unwarranted state
prosecution, the pregnant woman is effectively precluded from exercis-
ing her fundamental right. The suggested guidelines have been proposed
as a solution to this and other problems surrounding exercise of the
abortion right. It is hoped that the states will act expeditiously to imple-
ment legislation incorporating these guidelines. However, should the
states fail to act, the Supreme Court must take the initiative to provide
appropriate guidance in order to preserve and protect the woman's fun-
damental right to abortion.
Mary Sebek
119. See, e.g., GA. CODE §26-1202(a) (1972) (affirmative defense to criminal abortion
that a licensed physician performed the abortion to preserve the life or health of the
pregnant woman); Law of July 28, 1961, ch. 38, §23-1, [1961] Ill. Laws 1983 (repealed
1973) (affirmative defense to criminal abortion that a licensed physician performed the
abortion to preserve the life of the pregnant woman).
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